Debunking Trans Mythology - Part One

On Identity

This is the first in an irregular series on the flaws that permeate Gender Identity ideology. There is no better place to start than with ‘identity’ itself.

Can a Person Identify as a Tiger?

Framing the Question

However one words this question, “Is it permissible for a person to identify as a tiger,” “Is it possible for …” etc., then it is clearly still a yes/no style of question that, in reality, only affords two possible answers.

Of course, ask it of one thousand people and one might receive one thousand differently nuanced replies, but the only alternative conclusions are yes or no. The view of anyone who ‘isn’t sure’ or ‘doesn’t know’ or prevaricates in some other way should probably be discarded. Whilst the question might be considered to have some nuanced complexity, I suspect that any reluctance to answer would disappear if the question were to be asked anonymously.

Is each of those two possible answers equally valid? Ostensibly, the answer to that question is yes, on the basis that it appears to be a matter of opinion. Naturally, it isn’t quite as simple as that, for, despite what I said above, the specific formulation of the question is really rather important. This is because the use of the words ‘can’, ‘permissible’ or ‘possible’ has implications related to our understanding of the meaning of those words.

For example, and at the risk of getting ahead of myself here, it might be possible to say that the only proper answer to the question is no, for obvious reasons (which should become apparent later).

Freedom of Expression

So, let’s try to revise the question.

“Does a person have the inherent capacity to claim, if she so chooses, to state that she believes herself to be a tiger?”

This is a much better formulation of the question because it focusses on the fundamental issue of freedom of expression. One is really asking whether it is possible to deny a person the ability to openly state her beliefs, whatever they might be.

Without entering into an argument about whether there are some beliefs that should not be capable of being expressed openly (this isn’t an article about free-speech absolutism), it is reasonable to assert that, in fact, there is only one answer to this specific question, which is yes, of course a person can express that particular belief.

The reason for this is twofold.

Firstly, a person has the fundamental right (in the proper sense of that word) to the sanctity of his own thoughts and beliefs. It isn’t the prerogative of another person, be that an individual, the state or some other entity, to deny him his thoughts, beliefs and feelings.

Secondly, absent some overriding reason, this is not the sort of belief that should be suppressed, and it is difficult to think of what an ‘overriding reason’ would look like in this context.

So, of course, there is no reason why a person should be prevented from stating openly that they believe themselves to be a tiger, that they ‘identify as’ a tiger.

Having established that right to freedom of expression, it is important to note that this is, ultimately, the wrong question that is being asked. The real question is that if a person ‘identifies as’ a tiger is he actually a real tiger?

Objective Reality Over Belief

At this point, it might be worth noting that this is not an article aimed at the professional philosopher or written from the standpoint of any particular philosophical model. I am not interested in arcane philosophical minutiae. This is, ultimately, a question of common sense that all but those reluctant to engage can answer very straightforwardly.

The answer is no, a person who claims to identify as a tiger is not really a tiger, for the very obvious reason that no human being can be a tiger however much she wants it or believes it to be the case. (This is what I meant earlier when I alluded to the fact that some might have said that ‘no’ was the only possible answer to the question as originally posed.)

The answer is still ‘no’, even if the person concerned wears a tiger costume, has her body painted to resemble a Bengal tiger, has oversized canines implanted into her mouth or has a tail surgically attached to her rear end.

The reason for this relates to biology, how we use language and how we define categories. Everyone will understand and agree with this apart from postmodernists and queer theorists, for whom biology, language and categories are anathema.

In biology, we separate organisms into categories and classifications and we use words as understandable labels to both identify and define those categories. Hence, while humans and tigers are both members of the kingdom Animalia and are also mammals, they are entirely different species, distinguishable through DNA as well as basic observation skills. Tigers are felines, humans are not and it isn’t possible to change species. There may be some people who would reject this, but they would be mistaken to do so; humans are not tigers.

So what about these questions?

“Does an adult man have the inherent capacity to claim, if he so chooses, to state that he believes himself to be a seven-year-old boy? If so, does that mean he is actually a seven-year-old boy?”

I would hope that it is fairly clear from what is stated above, that the answers to those questions are, ‘yes’ and, ‘no’, respectively. If a man wants to believe that he is a seven-year-old boy and claim that ‘identity’ openly, then he can do so, but it is not objectively true that he is one. The category difference is not, in this case, related to being members of a different species (though many a parent might have doubts about that) but to the fact that an adult cannot be seven-years old. Those two categories are mutually exclusive.

And before any pedant turns around and claims that there are, or may be, many adults who, for no fault of their own, might have a functional age of seven, that still does not mean that they are, actually, seven-years old. An adult is not a child.

Logically, therefore, applying this to the question of, in shorthand form, whether a man can identify as a woman, the answer is, yes he can but that does not make him an actual woman. Objectively, he remains a man irrespective of his own subjective notions. Not only is this material reality it is also the law with respect to discrimination legislation in the UK, following the judgment in the For Women Scotland case in the UK Supreme Court.

The Incoherence of Gender Identity

All this leads, inevitably, to the general problem with ‘identities’, which is that however ‘real’ the individual’s perceptions might be that the belief they hold is true, that does not make it objectively true. One can shout from the rooftops that one identifies as a red, double-decker London bus, but it can never be objectively true. ‘Identity’ can never trump reality.

This brings us back to postmodernism and queer theory, philosophies that view reality as a social construct shaped by power and language, not fixed truths. While they offer insights into cultural narratives, their core aim is to deconstruct language and dismantle meaning itself, denying science and objective reality. This is where transgenderism, along with critical race theory and social justice models, finds its fuel, prioritizing subjective ‘identities’ over material facts and leaving categories like ‘woman’ undefined.

It is also why, of course, we have the rather astonishing problem that there are politicians, activists and organisations that cannot define what a woman is, or rather, they are reluctant to do so except by means of producing self-referential alternatives.